

# Navigating a Precarious World through the Investor's Rutter

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## *Commentary on the IMF Annual Report 2026*

*Richard Marney and Philipp Waeber – October 2026*

### 1. The IMF's world in 2026

The IMF's Annual Report 2026, *Navigating a Precarious World*, tells a relatively simple story. The global economy has proved surprisingly resilient, but the environment in which countries are operating is becoming progressively harder. Growth held up during 2025 and inflation continued to decline despite geopolitical tensions, conflicts and significant changes in the global trading system. Private-sector adaptability, policy support and technology investment all helped. The Middle East conflict from February 2026, however, introduced another major supply shock through energy, commodities and supply chains. It did so at a time when public debt was already high and medium-term growth prospects remained relatively weak.

Four messages stand out. First, fiscal space is becoming tighter. Debt is rising, interest costs have increased and governments face growing demands from defence, ageing populations, energy security and investment. Second, AI is becoming economically significant. The IMF estimates that AI-related investment contributed around 0.5 percentage point to US growth in 2025, but it also sees risks to employment, inequality and financial stability. Third, globalisation is changing rather than disappearing. World trade still grew by almost 5% in 2025, but supply chains and trading relationships are being reorganised. Fourth, finance itself is changing, with stablecoins, tokenisation and CBDCs creating both opportunities and new risks.

The common thread is resilience. The IMF does not present a world moving uniformly towards crisis. Rather, countries are being subjected to more frequent and overlapping pressures, and their ability to absorb those pressures increasingly matters.

This provides a useful opportunity to interpret the report through the Investor's Rutter. The IMF is primarily asking how countries can maintain macroeconomic and financial stability. The investor's question is slightly different: why do countries exposed to broadly similar global forces follow different trajectories, and what does that mean for an investment?

### 2. Weather, Winds and Currents

The Rutter distinguishes between three types of forces affecting a country's trajectory. Weather consists of shocks and events—war, political disruption, financial crises or commodity shocks—which may be severe but are essentially episodic. Winds are more persistent external forces, such as geopolitical change, technological development, climate change or changing global financial conditions, which can help or hinder a country over an extended period. Currents are the deeper and slower-moving structural forces shaping the direction of travel—demographics, economic transformation, institutional development and longer-term changes in productivity and competitiveness. The distinction matters because investors

should not confuse a dramatic piece of Weather with a change in the underlying Current, while recognising that sufficiently persistent Winds—or repeated shocks—can eventually alter that Current.

The IMF Annual Report contains examples of all three. The Middle East conflict and associated energy shock are principally Weather. AI, changing trade relationships and geopolitical fragmentation are increasingly important Winds. Demographic ageing, changing economic structures and the longer-term evolution of productivity are closer to Currents. The categories are not rigid: a persistent Wind such as AI can itself alter productivity and economic structure and, over time, change the Current. The investor's task is to understand how these forces interact with a country's Endowments and Enablers and whether, together, they are changing its underlying trajectory.

Against that distinction, the IMF report is particularly useful because it contains examples of shocks, persistent external forces and deeper structural change. None is, by itself, an investment conclusion. The important issue is how each interacts with a country's Endowments and, particularly, its Enablers.

Fiscal risk illustrates the point. The IMF notes that public debt is rising and was already on track to reach World War II-era levels by 2028, while global interest expenditure has increased from roughly 2% to almost 3% of GDP in only three years. The Middle East conflict adds further pressure through higher energy prices, tighter financial conditions and slower growth, with energy-importing and especially low-income countries facing the greatest strain. Those numbers tell us something important about condition, but rather less about trajectory.

For trajectory, we need to ask whether governments can mobilise revenue, reprioritise expenditure, reform pensions and subsidies, select productive investments and retain policy credibility when conditions become difficult. The IMF itself stresses rigorous fiscal prioritisation, revenue mobilisation, multiyear budgeting and better cost-benefit analysis of public investment. Two countries with similar debt ratios can therefore represent quite different risks. Debt tells us where they are; institutions and policy capacity tell us more about where they may be going.

### **AI and the conversion mechanism**

AI makes the same point from the opportunity side. It is a global technological force, but countries are not equally positioned to exploit it. The relevant investor question is not simply whether AI will matter. It is which countries can convert it into productivity, growth and investment opportunities. That depends on Enablers—skills, infrastructure, institutions, regulation and private-sector capability.

The IMF's examples make this concrete. Singapore sits at the top of the IMF's AI Preparedness Index, reflecting strong digital infrastructure, education and forward-looking regulation. But the regional point is broader. East Asia is already a hub for semiconductor manufacturing and design, while Southeast Asia may be able to build on its established manufacturing base to move further up the value chain as AI is deployed more widely. The technological Wind is global; the capacity to capture it is national.

The United States illustrates both sides of this process. The IMF estimates that AI-related technology investment added around 0.5 percentage point to US GDP growth in 2025, while recent productivity acceleration may partly reflect early AI adoption. Yet the report also warns that increasingly debt-financed AI investment may fail to generate the expected returns. It highlights circular financing relationships among hyperscalers, data-centre developers and chipmakers as a possible channel through which problems in one part of the AI ecosystem could spread to others. Strong innovation and capital-market Enablers therefore coexist with emerging financial and labour-market risks.

The labour-market implications reinforce the point. IMF research cited in the report suggests that workers with AI-related skills are benefiting, as are some lower-skilled service workers supporting higher earners, while middle-skilled workers in occupations exposed to automation risk being left behind. The same technology can therefore strengthen aggregate productivity while creating quite different sectoral, social and ultimately political consequences.

### **Trade: fragmentation, reorientation and regional opportunity**

Trade provides another example. The easy headline is fragmentation. The more interesting fact is that global trade volumes nevertheless rose by almost 5% in 2025, with technology-related goods continuing to grow briskly. The structural change in US trade policy accelerated the reorientation of trade, particularly in Asia. Economies responded not only through bilateral understandings with the United States but also by pursuing new opportunities with one another and within their regions.

The Middle East conflict adds another layer. The IMF notes that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz produced what the International Energy Agency described as the largest-ever cut to global energy supplies, with knock-on effects for commodities, food and wider supply chains. The response is a search for supply chains that are more resilient, even if less efficient. For investors, this is important: deteriorating Weather can create new Currents as production, trade and investment are redirected.

ASEAN illustrates the opportunity. The IMF argues that deeper integration within ASEAN can support more resilient and sustainable growth. Economies with favourable geography, infrastructure, workforce capabilities and established manufacturing ecosystems may therefore capture investment being redirected through new supply chains. The relevant question is not simply which countries are exposed to trade tensions, but which are positioned to benefit from the resulting reorganisation.

### **Different starting points, different adjustments**

The IMF's contrast between China and the United States is particularly useful. China is identified as an external-surplus economy where further progress towards consumption-led growth could improve welfare while narrowing trade and current-account surpluses. The United States starts from almost the opposite position: as an external-deficit economy, credible fiscal consolidation could reduce import demand and reliance on external financing. The global environment is common, but the starting positions and required adjustments are not.

This is precisely where a Rutter interpretation adds value. Neither a surplus nor a deficit determines trajectory on its own. The more important question is whether domestic institutions, political incentives and economic structures permit the adjustment that the starting position requires. Condition matters, but the capacity to change condition matters more.

### **Digital finance: another test of Enablers**

Digital finance follows much the same pattern. Asia has long been a leader in digital payments. The IMF points to widespread mobile-phone use, proactive government regulation and regional payment standards—particularly within ASEAN—as factors supporting advanced fintech ecosystems. Asia is consequently becoming an important testing ground for stablecoins and other digital payment systems, with potential gains from lower cross-border payment costs and wider financial access.

But the opportunity comes with risks around financial stability, capital flows and currency substitution. Again, the technology itself does not determine the outcome. Regulatory quality, central-bank credibility,

financial-market depth and institutional adaptability determine how effectively the opportunity is converted.

### **From resilience to trajectory**

Running through all of this is the IMF's concept of resilience. For investors, resilience should not simply mean that a country survived the last shock. It is better understood as the capacity to absorb shocks without allowing them to derail the underlying trajectory.

The four dimensions of the Rutter help organise that judgement. Endowments describe what the country has to work with—geography, resources, demographics and location. Enablers tell us how effectively those advantages can be used—institutions, governance, human capital, infrastructure and policy credibility. Context captures the changing external environment described throughout the IMF report. Outcomes tell us whether the interaction is producing productivity, investment, fiscal sustainability, financial stability and improving prosperity.

The IMF's country and regional examples illustrate why this matters. Singapore's digital infrastructure, education and regulation position it well for AI. The United States combines powerful innovation capacity with emerging risks from the financing and labour-market effects of AI. China and the United States face very different adjustments to their external positions. ASEAN economies may gain from deeper regional integration, supply-chain reorganisation and increasingly sophisticated digital-finance ecosystems. These are not simply differences in today's economic numbers. They reflect different combinations of Endowments, Enablers and Context—and therefore different prospective trajectories.

### **From country trajectory to investment judgement**

There is, however, a final step. The IMF is principally interested in countries. Investors invest in transactions.

A country may benefit from supply-chain diversification while a particular sector loses. AI may increase national productivity while undermining an individual company's business model. Digital finance may improve financial inclusion while weakening incumbent banks. Fiscal consolidation may strengthen sovereign creditworthiness while reducing demand in particular industries.

The Rutter therefore needs to carry the analysis further: country trajectory → sector → company/project → transaction structure → residual investment risk. Country analysis establishes the environment in which the investment operates; it does not determine the investment decision.

Seen this way, the IMF's Annual Report 2026 describes a world that is becoming more precarious, but not uniformly more dangerous. The Weather and Winds are becoming stronger. What matters is how well individual countries are equipped to navigate them.

The question is therefore not simply "What is happening to the country?" It is "What determines what happens next—and how does that eventually reach the investment?" That is the difference between describing country risk and exercising investment judgement.